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Executive Summary
This briefing paper considers the extent to which renewables in Scotland are shaped by the policy responsibilities and 
decisions of multiple governments: the Scottish Government, the UK Government and the EU. 
Drawing on 12 interviews with representatives of industry and government, as well as a workshop bringing together 
academics with key stakeholders, the paper explores the significance of EU membership in shaping Scottish renewables 
and considers the likely effects of the UK’s exit from the EU. 
Despite limited constitutional power, promoting renewables has been a key priority for successive Scottish Governments, 
central to both its environmental and economic policies. While the main policy drivers rest with the UK Government, 
stakeholders in Scotland place importance on the EU regulatory framework, EU funding and finance, multinational 
cooperation and long-term strategic thinking in supporting the development of renewables in Scotland.
Our briefing identifies varying levels of concern among key stakeholders with regard to the impact that Brexit may have 
on renewables in Scotland. Many expect policy continuity, irrespective of the UK-EU relationship. Others are fearful of the 
uncertainty surrounding access to the EU internal market, access to project funding, access to labour and expertise, and 
added costs and delays in supply chains in an industry heavily reliant on kit from the EU.
The biggest impact of Brexit to date has been the dominance of the issue on the political agenda, leaving little space for 
policy development in other areas, including energy. In addition to the regulatory, financial and trade challenges it may 
generate, Brexit has also reignited the debate on Scotland’s constitutional future, creating further uncertainties for the 
future of renewables.
Brexit and Renewables in Scotland
Renewables in a Multi-
level Policy Environment
The development of renewable energy in Scotland is 
shaped by the policies, decisions and behaviour of policy 
actors across multiple jurisdictions. Although the 
ownership, exploitation, regulation, supply and taxation 
of energy remains primarily a responsibility of the UK 
Parliament and Government, the EU and the devolved 
institutions have become important players in the field 
(Table 1). 
Before the Lisbon Treaty made energy a shared competence 
of the EU and member states, EU influence was mainly via 
internal market competition policy, environmental policy 
and support for research and innovation. Since 2007, 
the EU has developed a specific role in energy market 
integration, energy security of supply, low carbon energy 
and demand reduction, with continued influence via 
indirect competences, including in relation to the 
environment and market integration. This has enabled the 
EU to extend its regulatory reach to promote the transition 
to a low carbon economy, reduce energy demand and build 
an EU Energy Union. 
Following the introduction of devolution in 1999, 
the energy competences of the devolved institutions 
were limited mainly to the promotion of renewables and 
energy efficiency, and consents for new electricity and 
gas installations. More recently, the Scottish Parliament 
acquired consenting powers for onshore oil and gas 
licensing and schemes to alleviate fuel poverty (Thomas 
and Ellis, 2017; Cairney, et al., 2019). Despite this relatively 
limited constitutional competence, successive Scottish 
Governments have put renewables at the heart of their 
environmental and economic agendas, with increasingly 
ambitious targets. 
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Table 1. Distribution of the Most Relevant Renewable Energy Competences
Level Direct competences Indirect competences
European 
Union
Internal energy market 
Promotion of renewable energy
Cross-border energy exchanges
Gas and electricity system operation
State aid regulation
Competition law
Trans-European networks
Innovation/R&D funding
Structural & strategic funding 
EU Agencies Cross-border market integration and network 
harmonisation (ACER)
United 
Kingdom/
Great 
Britain
Regulation of energy markets and networks
Licensing of energy producers, suppliers and 
network operators
Energy security 
Renewable energy subsidies/grants
Competition law
Intellectual property and commercial law
Climate change laws
R&D funding
UK/GB 
Agencies
Gas and electricity market and network 
regulation (Ofgem)
Competition law 
Devolved Promotion of renewable energy
Electricity installations consents
Crown estate 
Marine licensing and planning
Property law 
Environmental Impact Assessment
Economic development
Local Land-use planning
Source: modified from the full energy policy table in Cairney et al (2019a: 460) and our Report 1
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Scottish leadership in 
renewables
The 2017 Scottish Energy Strategy set a 2030 target of 50% 
of the energy required for heat, transport and electricity 
consumption to be supplied from renewable sources. 
The targets are backed by a ‘whole systems’ energy 
strategy (see Cairney et al., 2019b), a sympathetic planning 
and consenting regime for onshore and offshore wind, 
investment for renewables research and innovation to 
boost marine renewables, support for community 
renewables, and high-profile leadership from successive 
First Ministers, especially under SNP administrations. 
These policy ambitions have seen Scotland contribute 
disproportionately to the growth in renewables in the UK, 
and thus to UK efforts to meet EU renewables obligations. 
By 2017, Scotland accounted for around a quarter of the 
UK’s installed capacity of electricity generated from 
renewable sources, including just under 40% of the UK’s 
wind power (BEIS, 2018, Table 2).  Generation output from 
Scottish renewables also accounted for around a quarter 
of the UK total, including 58% of total UK generation from 
onshore wind (ibid, Table 3). Scotland’s disproportionate 
contribution to the UK’s EU obligations in energy – even 
more pronounced before the recent upsurge in offshore 
wind in England – has in the past helped the Scottish 
Government to punch above its constitutional weight in 
energy policy, despite very limited devolved powers in this 
field (see Figure 2).     
Source: Scottish Government, 2017: 32
Figure 1: Scotland’s Energy Target
Source: BEIS, Renewable electricity in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the regions of England in 2017, p.76
Figure 2: Trends in capacity from renewables by country
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Despite European integration and devolution, the UK 
Government has continued to retain the main policy 
drivers supporting investment in renewables, especially in 
relation to regulations, obligations and incentives targeted 
at the energy industry. Yet, these have been developed 
within, and must be compliant with, the EU regulatory 
environment. Electricity market reform (EMR) in the UK 
has had to be compatible with EU Single Market legislation, 
and the Commission’s new guidelines on state aid for 
energy and environmental protection, as well as the wider 
EU climate and energy framework. EMR introduced a 
carbon price floor – a tax on fossil fuel generation – set 
limits to power plant emissions, introduced a capacity 
mechanism to ensure supply matched demand, and 
replaced the Renewables Obligation with a new subsidy 
regime of Contracts for Difference. The binding target 
assigned by the EU Renewable Energy Directives – that 15% 
of all UK energy demand (for heat, transport and power) be 
sourced from renewables by 2020 – placed obligations on 
the UK Government that incentivised a benign regulatory 
environment for renewables generation across the UK. 
The disproportionate contribution that Scottish renewables 
had been making to efforts to meet the UK’s obligations 
gave the Scottish Government some influence in the 
intergovernmental arena, especially in relations with the 
former Department for Energy and Climate Change 
(Royles and McEwen, 2015). This helps to explain why 
even big industry players invest as much time engaging 
with the Scottish Government as with the UK Government. 
An interviewee from one of the Big 6, noting the priority it 
placed on onshore wind, told us that it saw the Scottish 
Government as an ally in its call for changes to UK 
Government policy on onshore wind.  
The EU renewables 
funding landscape
The industry in Scotland has benefited from the financial 
incentives introduced by the EU. Over 40% of EU funding is 
channelled through European Structural and Investment 
Funds (ESI Funds), with around 25% of the total targeted 
towards climate and low carbon energy projects. The Scottish 
Government is the Managing Authority for two ESI funds – 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the 
European Social Fund. These ESI funds represent a small, 
but significant, proportion of the Scottish Government’s 
budget, equating to €941million in the current EU budget 
round (2014-2020) (Scottish Government, 2019). The ERDF, 
in particular, has been used by the Scottish Government to 
provide match funding to support schemes such as the Low 
Carbon Travel and Transport Challenge and the Low Carbon 
Infrastructure Transition Programme. More significant has 
been the funding secured for low carbon research and 
innovation from the Framework Programme/Horizon 2020, 
which accounts for around a quarter of programme funds 
in the current round. In addition, numerous energy projects 
have been funded via Interreg, the various Territorial 
Cooperation Programmes (e.g. Northern Periphery, Arctic, 
Atlantic, North Sea, etc), the North West Europe programme, 
and the Competitiveness and Innovation programme1. 
Our interviewees noted the significance of this funding, 
especially for new technologies and innovations, including 
hydrogen and tidal and wave schemes, where risk premiums 
are higher. In addition to the financial benefits, interviewees 
emphasised how EU-funded research programmes have 
fostered vital knowledge exchange and collaborative learning 
and innovation as a result of the requirement for teams to be 
drawn from multiple member states. As one interviewee 
noted, partnerships with other countries help to ensure there 
is collaboration and back-up to spread risk.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) has also helped to 
finance large scale renewables projects in Scotland, acting 
in particular as an early funder in large scale, high cost and 
high-risk innovation projects. Typically, the EIB provides up 
to 50% loan funding for new, often high risk, projects 
supporting the EU’s strategic objectives. In 2015, the EIB 
provided €13.8bn finance for energy projects, thought to 
support roughly two-thirds of all European offshore 
wind capacity. An example is the £525m loan toward the 
construction of the Beatrice offshore wind farm 14km off 
the coast of Caithness – then the largest single EIB loan for 
an offshore project. Officially opened in July 2019, 
Beatrice became Scotland’s largest single source of 
renewable electricity, capable of powering 450,000 homes.   
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1 A full list of funded projects is available via the Scottish EU Funding Portal.
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UK and EU policy 
divergence?
In its Annual Energy Statement, the Scottish Government 
(2019a: 20) noted: ‘Legally-binding EU renewable energy and 
energy efficiency targets have played a defining role in stimulating 
the huge growth seen in Scottish renewable energy and in 
generating significant inward investment’. Our interviewees 
reinforced that view. In addition to the financial and 
regulatory incentives identified above, they noted that the 
EU represented a source of stability in the face of UK 
instability. Whereas the EU had put in place long-term 
goals, with legal obligations or targets assigned to member 
states to help meet these, successive UK governments were 
considered to be more sceptical of the value of binding 
targets. In particular, interviewees were critical of what 
they viewed as the short-term horizons and reactive 
approach of UK energy policy. One interviewee at the 
pioneering end of the renewables sector suggested that the 
UK Government has never been keen on renewables and 
never, acting independently, been pro-active in that space, 
for example by promoting domestic supply chains. 
Another noted that it puts most effort into engaging 
with the Scottish Government and the EU as the UK 
Government ‘just aren’t helpful’ and UK policy has 
‘let us down’. 
The future of onshore wind, in particular, has been 
adversely affected by UK policy change, which saw 
windfarm developers banned from competing for subsidies. 
This change of policy direction has had a frustrating effect 
on Scottish policy ambition. It has made it significantly 
more difficult to bring to completion those onshore 
windfarms that have already secured planning consent 
within a favourable Scottish policy context. Figure 3 below 
presents a visual manifestation of the significant gap in 
consented projects and those under construction. Of the 
1420 onshore turbines that have secured consent in 
Scotland, with a combined capacity of 4GW, just 207, 
with 0.5GW capacity, are under construction. 
The equivalent figures for onshore wind in England are 
147 consented turbines (0.186 GW capacity), of which 
24 are under construction, with a combined capacity 
of just 19MW (Renewables UK). 
Figure 3: Onshore windfarms in Scotland, operational (blue), under construction (purple) and consented (red)
Source: Derived from Renewables UK, UKWED, 2019
Dots indicate windfarms, numbers correlate to number of sites, filled dots indicate a single site.
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The impact of Brexit
Brexit effects may potentially be felt across three domains 
– the regulatory and policy frameworks governing 
renewable energy; access to EU funding streams; and the 
broader conditions of trade in energy and related goods 
and services – but there is still considerable uncertainty 
as to both the nature and scale of those effects (McHarg, 
2017). Three years after the EU referendum, it remains 
unclear whether and when the UK will exit the EU, when 
EU law (including new rules such as the 2018 Renewable 
Energy Directive)2 will cease to apply in the UK, what the 
conditions of withdrawal will be, and what sort of 
relationship the UK will have with the EU in future. 
The draft Political Declaration accompanying the 
Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by Theresa May’s 
government suggested that the UK would no longer be 
part of the Internal Energy Market (EU, 2019), but the 
precise nature of the future relationship would be open 
to negotiation, and political priorities may change. So far, 
this prolonged uncertainty has been the major concrete 
impact of Brexit, affecting the ability of renewable energy 
businesses to plan with confidence. 
Regulatory and Policy Frameworks
In principle, Brexit offers the opportunity to reform legal 
rules and policies directly or indirectly governing the 
deployment of renewable energy currently set at the EU 
level, although there may in practice be little room for 
manoeuvre if the UK remains closely aligned with the 
Internal Energy Market.  
Our interviewees anticipated relatively little change in this 
area. In the short term, EU and EU-derived rules would 
continue in force as ‘retained EU law’ under the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. A range of statutory 
instruments have also been enacted to maintain the 
operability and integrity of UK energy legislation, and to 
ensure that the energy market can continue to function in 
the event of a no-deal Brexit. No significant revision of the 
allocation of energy policy-related competences between 
the UK and devolved levels is envisaged, and some new 
domestic common frameworks are likely in areas currently 
governed by EU law, such as emissions trading and state 
aids (Cabinet Office, 2019).
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2  Directive 2018/2001/EU, OJ L328/82, 21 December 2018.  The Directive becomes binding on Member States on 30 June 2021. 
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In the longer term, interviewees also expect a reasonably 
high degree of policy continuity despite the removal of EU 
legal constraints. On the one hand, the UK is regarded as 
having been a leader rather than a follower in the 
development of EU climate and energy policy, especially 
with respect to emissions reduction and market 
integration. In addition, international climate 
commitments and energy security demands will continue 
to ensure the UK remains on a trajectory towards 
decarbonisation. On the other hand, the revised Renewable 
Energy Directive no longer imposes binding national 
targets, and these had in any case not been sufficient to 
prevent the UK Government withdrawing or reducing 
financial support for renewables. 
When pressed, some interviewees conceded that Brexit 
might present an opportunity to revise the detail of 
regulations that impose constraints on renewable energy 
developments, such as state aid or environmental impact 
assessment rules. However, one of the biggest perceived 
downsides to the Brexit process so far has been to crowd 
out the space for domestic policy development. 
For instance, interviewees pointed to the repeated delays 
in publication of the energy white paper and associated 
legislation that had been expected in summer 2019. 
In addition, some interviewees raised questions over the 
impact the loss of UK influence could have upon the 
development of EU energy policy. The absence of the UK 
could create space for some other member states to push 
an agenda that may weaken the EU’s commitment to a 
renewables-friendly regulatory environment.  
Funding
There was greater concern amongst our interviewees about 
their ability to continue to secure research and investment 
funding currently provided from EU sources. This was 
particularly worrying for smaller companies and those 
involved in more innovative technologies which are heavily 
reliant on public funding, such as marine renewables or 
hydrogen fuel cells. 
If the UK leaves the EU with a deal, the transition period 
during which the deal was implemented would ensure 
continuity of funding at least until the end of 2020 (or the 
end of the transition period). In the event of No Deal, the 
UK Government has pledged to maintain project funding to 
the end of the current funding round (the end of 2020), but 
uncertainties surround what comes next. In any plausible 
Brexit scenario, the UK would have third country status for 
the purpose of access to European funds. As such, UK-
based projects could still participate in research and 
innovation funding, but not as leaders. Several of our 
interviewees reported that Brexit has already had an 
impact in this area. For instance, Scottish companies have 
been unable to act as project leads for grant applications, 
some projects have not proceeded due to uncertainty, grant 
applications have been cancelled by the European 
Commission, and developers have been unable to secure 
UK match funding for EU grants. 
Particular concerns have also been raised about the lack of 
UK support for wave and tidal projects, where risks and 
costs remain high. Scotland is widely recognised for its 
potential in marine renewables, though development has 
so far fallen short of matching long-held ambition, despite 
significant government support for demonstration sites 
and research and development (see Hannon, et al, 2017). 
One interviewee working in marine renewables expressed 
frustration at the likely lost opportunity to capitalise on the 
new EU Innovation Fund, a €10 billion fund generated from 
Emissions Trading Scheme revenues to support the 
demonstration of innovative low carbon technologies 
within EU member states. 
Market Conditions
Our interviewees expressed significant concern over 
future trading conditions. Whilst there is no real risk 
of being unable to access European markets even in a 
No-Deal Brexit scenario, trade in both energy and related 
products and services could become more difficult and 
more expensive.  
For example, trade in electricity over interconnectors is 
likely to continue, but a loss of regulatory alignment could 
reintroduce inefficiencies and so raise prices (see Geske 
et al, 2018). Although the energy industry would not face 
the challenges of those like the food industry, that operate 
under ‘just-in-time’ supply chains, the import of 
components for renewable energy projects may be slower 
and more expensive due to tariffs and customs checks, 
and it may also be more difficult to secure access to skilled 
labour if (as is very likely) free movement of workers is 
restricted. Equally, Scottish-based researchers and 
developers may be less able to sell their knowledge-based 
services overseas. There is also a lack of clarity about the 
impact of Brexit on foreign investment in the UK. 
While global energy firms are used to operating across 
jurisdictional boundaries, the political uncertainty 
surrounding Brexit may be a deterrent to firms who 
have the option of investing elsewhere.
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Renewable energy companies have differential capacities 
to manage these risks.  One interviewee from one of the 
Big 6 noted that it had been stockpiling parts needed for 
maintenance work as a hedge against the risk of disruption 
to supply chains in the event of a no deal Brexit. Although 
this hadn’t resulted in significant cost increases yet, he 
envisaged that new tariffs would generate new costs that 
would ultimately be borne by consumers. Others have 
sought to diversify into areas that are less risky and do not 
require so much government support. In addition, some 
interviewees see potential opportunities, for instance, 
to increase domestic inputs into renewable energy supply 
chains or to diversify into non-EU markets as a result of 
new trade deals. Regulatory change post-Brexit could also 
make the UK a more attractive investment market than 
other EU countries. However, such opportunities are 
unlikely to emerge overnight, and none of our interviewees 
considered these to outweigh the potential costs of Brexit.
Conclusion
All businesses dislike political uncertainty. However, it is 
particularly problematic in a sector like renewable energy 
which has high investment risk due to large capital costs 
and long investment horizons. Nevertheless, within the 
wider context of the global low carbon energy transition 
with its attendant risks, Brexit is just one more uncertainty 
on top of others; indeed, all of our interviewees pointed to 
UK Government policy as a more palpable source of 
uncertainty than the UK’s departure from the EU. 
Although Brexit may slow down and/or increase the cost 
of the transition to a low carbon energy system, it seems 
unlikely by itself to bring about major changes in the 
Scottish renewables sector. 
Nevertheless, the political consequences of Brexit are 
difficult to predict, and the future UK-EU relationship is not 
the only uncertainty. Brexit has already revived debates on 
Scottish independence, in light of the large majority in 
Scotland who continue to support EU membership. A new 
independence referendum that resulted in a vote for 
Scottish independence, especially if followed by Scotland 
acceding to the EU, could usher in a set of potentially more 
fundamental challenges for the Scottish energy sector. 
The Scottish Government’s prospectus in 2014 had 
envisioned continuity of the GB energy market after 
independence, and a strategic energy partnership 
between the Scottish and UK governments. That would 
be considerably more difficult in the context of Brexit, 
especially if the UK leaves the EU internal energy market.  
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